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Islam and the construction of modern nationalism:  The 
unintended consequences of state sponsored socialisation 
 
Stephen Vertigans 
Robert Gordon University, Aberdeen, UK 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Around the world approaches by Muslim governments to introduce secularisation and 
create national consciousness have relied heavily upon processes of state sponsored 
socialisation.  Across the overwhelming majority of Muslim societies, secular 
structures, processes and national identities are, to varying degrees, in place.  Overall, 
however, the increased prominence of Islam generally, and militant strands in 
particular, and the extent to which large numbers of people most strongly associate 
with religion rather than nation indicates that state sponsored socialisation has only 
been partially successful.  Islam is embedded within constructions of nationalism and 
in some instances religious influences are contributing to processes of radicalisation 
and challenges to secular governments.  To help explain this apparent paradox, in this 
chapter the emergence of Muslim nation-states and implementation of formal 
socialising processes is explored, and the concept of ‘unintended consequences’ is 
applied to nation-state policies and international relations.   These consequences, 
some of which stem from previous generations, continue to resonate today, 
contributing towards processes of radicalisation across Muslims societies and 
communities.  
 
Particular attention is placed upon failures and inconsistencies within attempts to 
control populations through socialisation, especially within education.  Incorporating 
Islam within the framework for national identification has had unforeseen and 
contradictory social and political outcomes which include demarcations between 
secularists and Islamicists and greater awareness of challenging militant Islamic 
discourse and the appreciation of terror tactics.  Both militant national and trans-
national groups are explored to attain a greater understanding of collective identities 
that are part of their appeal and the processes that contribute towards their formation.  
By acknowledging complexities within contemporary societies that are embedded 
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within opaque global relations, it is suggested that accurately predicting the long term 
consequences of social, political and economic actions has become increasingly 
difficult. This is exacerbated by governments’ adaptations of short term ‘solutions’ to 
long term problems.    
 
 
Creating Nationalism 
 
Unlike the general timelines of Western nationalism, Muslim nation-states tended to 
be achieved following campaigns for independence in the first half of the twentieth 
century.  The late formation of these countries can be heavily attributed to the 
consequences of Western colonialism and imperialism that resulted in huge regions 
being subjected to foreign control.  For militant Muslims who argue that for the 
ummah (global community) and transcending national boundaries within an all-
encompassing Islamic state, nationalism is a foreign imposition.  Habeck (2006) 
provides support for this view, suggesting that national consciousness, and in 
particular underpinning racial and ethnic identifications, was introduced to try shift 
allegiance away from the broader religious consciousness.  Arguably this was part of 
the strategy to divide and conquer and can be noticed across colonised territories.  
Ironically though, the religions of the colonised were to frequently become 
invigorated in response to colonialists approaches.  For example, in Sri Lanka and 
India, Buddhists and Hindus, Hindus and Muslims respectively, religion became 
embedded within more politicised forms of collective, ethnic and ultimately national 
identification (Lapidus 2002).  Similarly religion became a common form of 
unification between otherwise disparate groups across East and West Africa, Central, 
Southern and Southeast Asia, providing sources of solidarity that were strengthened 
during the conflicts and which were to become interwoven within subsequent 
successful national struggles for independence.   
 
With the formation of new nation-states with Muslim majorities, the first 
governments were confronted with the challenge of creating, embedding and 
sustaining national-consciousness.  To differing degrees, newly formed governments 
adopted elements of state building that were instrumental in the formation of Western 
nations.  However the Western versions evolved gradually, associated with industrial 
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modernisation and processes of technological advancement, growth of commerce, 
urbanisation, expansion of bureaucracy, the division of labour and increased literacy.  
In other words, the structural conditions, individual and social habitus 1  and 
spatialities were significantly different and could not be applied en masse. 
Nevertheless considerable imitation of Western ways of thinking and behaving were 
adopted and adapted, not always appropriately as will be discussed below.  To try 
develop culturally, socially, economically and politically, a range of modernisation 
processes were introduced both to transform agricultural and industrial infrastructures 
and to help generate national consciousness within the new boundaries.  Both were to 
prove problematic.  It was considered that to modernise required modern identities 
which necessitated the eradication of old ways of thinking and behaving.  This led, 
particularly in countries seeking to rapidly secularise such as Turkey, see below, to 
religious influence being undermined and attempts to diminish Islamic identification.  
The reasoning for the displacement of Islam relates to the consideration that religion 
was detrimental to progress.  Basing the argument upon Western ‘progress’, 
modernisers like the Turkish leader, Kemal Mustafa Atatürk, argued that the lack of 
religious institutions within power arrangements in the West suggested similar secular 
arrangements should be adopted.  Islam was subjected to state control and not vice 
versa.  Furthermore Islam was viewed as a potential threat to the task of creating 
national identification.  People were being encouraged to adopt nationalism as their 
primary collective allegiance and there were considerable concerns that religion 
would hinder both this and attempts to develop modern identities and infrastructures.2 
Consequently nationalism was promoted while simultaneously undermining Islam in 
order to create collective identification and loyalties to modern values and artificial 
demarcations that were often the result of power struggles, negotiation, compromise, 
and ultimately bureaucrats’ rulers.   
 
Post independence, administrative and legal systems were introduced across Muslim 
societies that originated from Western arrangements.  Processes to change forms of 
consciousness and norms of behaviour were embedded within structural 
                                                 
1 Norbert Elias’ (1978, 1996, 2000, Mennell 1992) concept of habitus is applied in this chapter.  
Individual habitus refers to acquired emotional and behavioural dispositions that are unique to the 
individual.  Learned characteristics that are shared with other members of the same group/s are aspects 
of the social habitus.  National and religious identifications are usually part of the social habitus 
because they are shared by the group, cult, movement or nation. 
2 Further details can be found in Arkoun (1988), Kepel (2004), Mardin (1989) and Vertigans (2003). 
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transformations.  At one level, the internalisation of national consciousness had 
already commenced for many of the new state citizens.  Independence for many 
nation-states was, at least in part, the outcome of struggles against colonialists and 
invaders, discussed above.  During the conflicts, attempting to defeat the colonialists 
proved to be a tremendous unifier, transcending ethnic, religious, tribal and language 
differences.  However, on achieving independence, the goal was achieved, the enemy 
had been withdrawn, was defeated.  With this outcome, the strength of the 
crosscutting loyalty to the nation was seriously weakened.  Following the demise of 
the threatening ‘other’ to stigmatise and invoke collective effervescence, there were 
limited commonalities that could draw together the disparate groups to be found 
within the new boundaries. By comparison, in many more established nation-states, 
the sense of belonging to a territory and peoples had already become solidified, 
moulded into a printed history of the nation that entwined the present with symbols 
and narratives from the past.  For peoples in these nation-states today, this form of 
collective consciousness is accepted uncritically, seemingly shared by the living and 
the dead.  The precise origins of the nation and selection, reformulation and 
fabrication of characteristics of the contemporary national ‘character’ are discarded 
during the formative processes.   
 
For the new Muslim governments these processes had to condensed in the haste to 
create new loyalties, explanations and sources of meaning that could provide 
nationalist frameworks of understanding and collective identification.  And in 
comparison with the emergence of Western nationalism which in some respects was 
the unintentional outcome of longer term interwoven social, psychological, economic 
and political processes (Elias 1996), these new nation-states deliberately designed 
programmes for national consciousness.  To some extent, this was to be achieved 
through the  widespread application of what Anderson (2006) described as ‘print 
capitalism’ and interrelated processes of growing educational programmes and rates 
of literacy which had proved instrumental in the emergence of national consciousness 
in the West.  These processes were to be integral in the formation of a common oral 
and written language and universal laws that were dispersed within the national 
boundaries by newly created centralised institutions.  Within many Muslim nation-
states these processes were implemented with some success.  Religion was formally 
subjected to state control, scientific methodology became more prominent, increasing 
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numbers of people adopted more ‘Western’ dispositions and contributed to an 
increasing challenge to divinity and fatalism.  Underpinning these changes were 
revised forms of social restraint and legislation that weakened the influence of 
religious institutions.  However the changes were not restricted to undermining 
Islamic courts and mosques.  If a new kind of ‘modern’ consciousness and better 
informed and controlled populace was to be created then the roles of existing, more 
‘traditional’ socialising agents also had to be reconsidered.  The widespread 
introduction of schools, and ultimately higher education, became central to these 
approaches.  With the huge expansion of learning opportunities large swathes of 
populations were able to acquire academic skills and thus contribute towards the 
emergence of a better qualified workforce and the modernisation of the industrial and 
administrative infrastructure.  Alongside this formal curriculum, the teaching 
programme was also designed to incorporate national and modern values and ways of 
thinking.  Education therefore was intended to entwine the development of academic 
and applied skills and knowledge with collective consciousness.  For the Muslim 
governments modernisation could only be achieved through transforming both 
behavioural and emotional dispositions.    
 
If this was to happen loyalties to existing local elite, family, tribal or community 
memberships had to be replaced or at least diminished in significance.  Individuals 
had to be encouraged to relegate or dismiss their existing allegiances and accept the 
new national consciousness as their primary source of allegiance.  In well established 
nation-states like the UK, this was a gradual process, as national identity became 
ingrained within social habitus that was transmitted across generations.  The 
durability of this collective consciousness is reflected in the ability to react and 
accommodate the nation-state’s constant flux and shifting dynamics.  However, 
providing frameworks of understanding and legitimacy for new boundaries and 
political elites posed a considerable dilemma.  Links had to be established with 
history, narrative, slogans and images to provide meaning and historical legitimacy.  
Conversely governments also wanted distance between the present and the recent past 
to strengthen the demarcations between the (‘progressive’) modern and (‘backward’) 
tradition.  Lapidus (2002: 819) elucidates upon how Muslim governments sought to 
achieve this, in different ways, through building ‘upon a fusion of historical lineage, 
ethnic, linguistic, and Islamic symbols recast in linguistic-ethnic and nationalist 
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terms.’  Because there was a requirement for recent history to be detached from the 
present periods were selected that were considered successful and in which the values 
that were being challenged were not prominent.  Arguably one of the most extreme 
attempts to plumb the past in order to underpin the present was the Egyptian emphasis 
upon a pre-Islamic history that stemmed from the Pharaohs (Gershoni and Jankowski 
1987).  In the newly formed Turkish and Iranian republics, similar attempts were 
introduced by Ataturk and Reza Shah respectively, who also distanced the history of 
their nations from Islam through the adaptation of what was largely a fictitious Turkic 
and Persian past.  This was to become a template that was adopted by many 
modernising Muslim governments.  Despite the considered attempts to encourage 
historical and contemporary integration, the deliberate omission of time periods 
resulted in a lack of continuity across language, symbols and culture (Vertigans 2009).  
Consequently the acceptance and internalisation of these ‘imagined pasts’ within 
modern consciousness was by no means universal and nation-states needed to 
consider alternative methods of generating nation consciousness, particularly as the 
so called traditional Muslims had their own history to draw upon and with which they 
could challenge secular processes of modernisation.   
 
The ‘Islamic Nation’  
 
Despite government policies that were designed both to eradicate the influence of 
religion and replace Islamic loyalties with those of the nascent nation-states, Islam 
and its histories remained embedded within individual and social habitus.  And by 
contrast to the secular adaptation of a longer term and disjointed history, religious 
figures were able to draw upon heroes, battles and victories that were more engrained 
within local cultures and thus had greater resonance for many than the oft fictitious 
past of the new nations.  Consequently in the secularists and Islamists discursive 
battle of the ‘Golden Ages’, the latter had greater credibility because their narrative 
was already established.  This enabled Islamists to draw upon the past with greater 
confidence, utilising events and narrative in order to provide meaning for 
contemporary experiences.  Furthermore by distinguishing between the expansions of 
the Muslim empires and their decline, most notably the Ottomans and abolition of the 
 7
caliphate3, Islamists challenged the ruling secularists’ argument that secularisation is 
required because religion within government is antiquated and incommensurate with 
progress.  On the contrary, for twentieth century Islamists like al-Banna (1906-49), 
Mawdudi (1903-79) and Qutb (1906-66, discussed below), ‘Golden Ages’ provided 
clear evidence, particularly the period of the prophet Muhammed and the four caliphs, 
of what religion was capable of when practised in accordance with theological 
doctrine.  By extension the decline of the empires was not the consequence of too 
much religion but too little.  These differing positions defined the ideological struggle 
over the nature of Muslim governments with both positions utilising the past in order 
to legitimise their moral and political legacies, collective characteristics and 
contemporary application of discourse in the evolution of the nation-states.  That the 
accuracy for these counter claims for discursive purity is somewhat contested with 
origins clouded in myths and multiple tribal, ethnic, familial and pagan pre-Islamic 
influences should not, as Dieckhoff (2005), observed detract from the impact upon 
social consciousness when the ‘Golden Age’ is invoked.  For the secularists, the 
immediate problem they faced was that the Islamists ‘Golden Age’ was more 
convincing than their own.  If they were to win the battle of ideas, they had to deliver 
in the present and provide evidence of their capabilities in the future.  In other words 
their actions had to provide the credibility for their discourses that their historical 
narrative often could not.  As part of this programme of delivery, the Islamists would 
be proved to be anachronisms.  Paradoxically their actions were to both deliver 
improvements and strengthen the appeal of religion.   
 
Creating and Challenging National Consensus: The intended and unintended 
consequences of government actions 
 
At this point it is important to establish the concept of ‘unintended consequences’ 
which will be applied to help explain the apparent contradictory outcomes of 
government policies.  Within social science, the concept has a long history, with the 
most obvious early example being Adam Smith’s ‘hidden hand of the market’ 
(Mennell 1977, van Krieken 1998).  Within sociology, the American sociologist 
                                                 
3 Caliphate is the title for the successor to the Prophet Muhammed. The Ottomans effectively captured 
the title from the Egyptian Mamluks in the sixteenth century.  Towards the end of the Ottoman period 
the title was largely detached from the populace and, at the time, its abolition attracted limited popular 
protest (Lewis 1974).  
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Robert Merton has been particularly prominent with his emphasis upon ‘the self-
fulfilling prophecy, whereby fears are translated into reality’ which ‘operates only in 
the absence of deliberate institutional controls’ (1967: 436).   For Merton therefore, 
while acknowledging that social processes can result in ironies and paradoxes 
(Vertigans and Sutton 2006), careful deliberation and organisation through 
institutional controls can minimise these unwanted outcomes.   By contrast, as 
Mennell (1977: 100) outlines, Norbert Elias considered unintentional outcomes to be 
inevitable.  This is because,  
 
as people have come to occupy more and more differentiated and 
specialised social positions, they have spun ever more complicated webs 
of interdependence, in which first hundreds, the thousands and finally 
millions have been caught up; the resulting figurations are neither planned 
nor within the control of any individual or group of individuals.   
 
The impact of this understanding of the complex, opaque and constraining processes 
in which we are all immersed is considerable.  For Elias (1978, 2000 [1939]), and 
contrary to Merton, governments like other groups of individuals, cannot possess the 
knowledge and foresight to be able to precisely and accurately calculate the impact of 
their policies and actions.  Unintended consequences are not wry infrequent 
occurrences.  Instead they are manifest within daily life and are instrumental in the 
shaping of individual and social experiences and identification.  When applying this 
insight into post independent Muslim governments, these problems are magnified as 
they seek to rapidly transform huge swathes of economic, agricultural, administrative 
and industrial activities alongside legal, cultural, social and political ways of 
constraining and liberating behaviour.  With limited relevant precedents, governments 
could not precisely establish the impact of their policies and the interacting multitude 
of local, national and international events and processes upon individual behavioural 
and emotional dispositions.  Nor, could they determine when individual and social 
habitus would shift to accord with the broader changes.  Consequently governments 
were operating in conditions that did not allow any institution to possess complete 
control over either their actions or their outcomes.  Inevitably therefore unintended 
consequences across Muslim societies were, and are, widespread and inevitable and 
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levels of uncertainty can only increase as the nation-states continue to modernise and 
further complicate the nature of social relationships and interdependencies.   
 
The complexities of societies and interwoven global processes has partly meant that 
despite the post independence rhetorical attacks upon religion, for millions of people, 
within many modernising nation-states, Islam remained integral to personal 
identification.  Indeed contrary to those early intentions, Islam has arguably grown in 
significance and religious institutions continue to provide spiritual and social services, 
particularly in localities where government activities are restricted.  There has been a 
tendency to associate this broader resurgence generally and growing militancy, in 
particular, as a reaction to the dominant secularisation thesis.  However as the 
following examples indicate, more radical forms of Islam have gained momentum 
during periods when nation-states have been more supportive of religion with the 
nature of their secularisation less oppressive or have conversely deliberately sought to 
embed religion within the early formative stages of the nation-state.  Three very 
different examples illuminate this.   
 
Following the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire and formation of the Turkish 
republic, Kemal Atatürk implemented a thorough programme of secularisation.  The 
programme included the adaptation of Swiss, Italian and German legal codes, the 
unification of education, abolition of numerous religious institutes and the 
subjugation of Islam to state control.4  Atatürk’s policies were to be hugely influential, 
resulting in Turkey becoming arguably the most secular Muslim nation-state and his 
model was imitated by other modernising governments including Algeria, Iran and 
Tunisia.  Nevertheless, despite this contemporary impression of Atatürk as the arch 
secularist, in the early days of the republic, religious leaders were incorporated within 
government as he sought to build consensual support in, and immediately after, the 
War of Independence.  When the leaders were no longer considered necessary or 
appropriate then they were discarded.5  In the process however Atatürk established 
another legacy, namely the utilisation of Islam to justify actions, legitimise policies 
                                                 
4 The reforms are discussed in greater detail in Berkes 1964, Geyikdağı1984, Mardin 1989, Toprak 
1981, Vertigans 2003. 
5 The diminution of religious figures is reflected in the drop of involvement with the governing party.  
In 1920 the ulema provided 20 per cent of delegates at the liberation leaders’ Congress.  This dropped 
to seven in 1923 and two in 1939.  
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and underpin support.  The entwining of politics and religion accelerated with the 
introduction of democracy in 1950 when levels of support for religious practice and 
facilities became electoral issues with numerous concessions made that subsequently 
contributed to the widespread introduction of religious schools and huge increase in 
the number of mosques.6  Furthermore, the appeal of Islam within politics was to 
result in the formation of numerous religious parties. In the 1970s the National 
Salvation Party, which campaigned on a relatively moderate religious platform, 
became a coalition member of government.  As a consequence, the party was able to 
utilise the system of patronage which existed within Turkish politics, and install 
supporters within important state institutions where religious influences increased.   
 
The incorporation of religion within politics has been hugely controversial and 
numerous parties have been banned for breach of the constitution.  Today the 
governing party is the democratically elected Justice and Development Party which is 
a mildly Islamic party.  Nevertheless since it was first elected in 2002 the party’s 
policies and actions have caused tremendous consternation to the secular military and 
intelligentsia as they struggle to balance the demands of the secular constitution and 
the more religious beliefs of their members and supporters.  To date, though these 
contradictions have not resulted in the emergence of a significant militant threat.  This 
can be partly attributed to the relative success of Atatürk’s reforms and ironically the 
ways in which subsequent politicians were able to strengthen Turkish nationalism 
through reference to the battles, symbols and narrative of the preceding Ottoman 
Empire.  In addition, the presence of Kurdish nationalism and the conflict in the 
Southeast of the country has conversely strengthened Turkish nationalism.  For Elias 
(1996), people these types of situations form social bonds around common defence to 
their lives and the survival of their group and, by extension, nation.  The collective 
‘we’ gains priority over the ‘I’ and this reflects the shift in emphasis from the survival 
of the individual to the group (nation).  Thus in times of crisis and heightened fear, 
collective effervescence provide the basis for solidarity.  Kurdish nationalism 
generally, and the use of terrorism in particular, provide a threat that in turn provides 
a source of unity for Turks.  By comparison with Turkey, some less secular nation-
                                                 
6 Further details can be found in Ahmad (1977), Heper (1985) and Vertigans (2003). 
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states are facing more threatening contradictions to their created senses of national 
identity, perhaps none more so then Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. 
 
The location of Saudi Arabia is central to Islam because the two most sacred sites at 
Mecca and Medina are based within its boundaries.7  This can be seen as instrumental 
both in the rationale for its existence and destruction.  When the nation-state was 
formed in 1932, religion was integral to that process, incorporated within political 
arrangements as the Saudi kingdom sought to establish itself as defender of the faith.  
As a consequence successive governments have promoted their role and by extension 
the Wahhabi strand of Islam that they adhere to.  The promotion of Wahhabism has 
resulted in considerable investment in religious and educational institutions both 
within Saudi Arabia and around the world.  At one level, this approach has been very 
successful.  Adherence to Wahhabism has risen within the nation-state and has grown 
dramatically in other countries.  For example, in South and Southeast Asia the 
appearance of millions of women has changed markedly in accordance with the dress 
code and gender distinctions associated with this more rigid and austere form of Islam.  
However this very success has caused unintentional problems.  Firstly, the emphasis 
upon the trans-national role of the Saudi government and the centrality of Islam to 
collective identification has contributed to Saudi nationalism being weak. Today the 
primary allegiance of large numbers of citizens is to religion and not the nation-state 
(Devji 2005).  This may help to explain the recent importation and rapid 
nationalisation of foreign sports stars in an effort to enhance Saudi athletics and 
football teams; a policy which is presumably designed at least in part to utilise sport 
as a method of generating and reinforcing national consciousness.   
 
Secondly, educating Muslims within and beyond Saudi Arabia about the absolutism 
of Islam creates something of a credibility problem for the government.  The 
internalisation of rigid standards and forms of behaviour means that people are more 
informed about Wahhabism which becomes the benchmark on which to judge the 
actions and policies of others, including the government.  This judgement is 
increasingly unfavourable as more Muslims realise that the Saudi government do not 
actually implement Wahhabism in the manner in which it is taught.  For example, the 
                                                 
7 Burke (2003), Halliday (2002), Jerichow (1997) and Niblock (2006) discuss the following aspects in 
greater detail.  
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rulers lack religious legitimacy, the shari’ah is not implemented, secular processes 
remaining prominent and some conservative and traditional aspects forms of Islam, 
which are embedded within taught Wahhabism, are largely excluded across the 
political, legal and public educational institutions.   
 
Finally, by attempting to appeal to Muslims across boundaries, particularly through 
the application of the concept of the ummah, the Saudi government is raising 
awareness about the periods when Islamic empires were dominant across regions that 
were not demarcated by contemporary boundaries. At the extreme of this perception 
are militants like Sayyid Qutb 8  who argued that a ‘Muslim’s nationality is his 
religion’.  Bin Laden has also sought to connect into this broader debate, arguing ‘that 
God blesses our umma with a state that includes all Muslims under its authority’.9   
Looked at from this perspective, and following on from the above contradictions, for 
many Muslims Saudi Arabia, the territorial entity, is a physical obstacle to the 
formation of the global ummah. In other words, the implementation of one Muslim 
community across the world will ultimately require the disappearance or destruction 
of existing nation-states, including Saudi Arabia.10 
 
Pakistan was created in 1947 following partition of India.  Both partition and the 
preceding years were extremely traumatic and instrumental in the discursive 
consciousness that was to be introduced. Like so many other newly formed nation-
states, the government sought to underpin national unity with particular forms of 
                                                 
8 Sayyid Qutb is cited in Faksh (1997: 10).   Qutb was an Egyptian militant who was imprisoned and 
ultimately executed in 1966.  His views have continued to be hugely influential and he is widely 
acknowledged as one of the leading militant ideologues.   
9 Bin Laden is cited in Lawrence (2005: 202).  Khosrokhavar (2005.: 61) explains when examining 
Qutb’s contributions, the neo-umma that is now promoted transcends national boundaries.  Loyalties 
are primarily based upon beliefs and not characteristics that are usually associated with nationalism 
such as ethnicity, race or existing nation.  Instead of closely defined geographical boundaries, ‘a 
mythical Islamic community’ is promoted.   
10 It should be stressed that this applies predominantly to the Sunni denomination within Islam and to 
which between 85 to 90 per cent of Muslims belong. By comparison, Shi’ism has been less associated 
with trans-nationalism, partly because their empires were less substantial and the denomination has 
generally been less numerically popular that Sunnism.  Shi’ism has also been more closely entwined 
within more modern forms of government, most notably within Iran following the 1979 revolution and 
the utilisation of religion to legitimise the new regime.  This was contrary to the then Iranian leader 
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s (1900-1989) declaration that Islam has no frontiers. Alongside this 
national approach, the Iranians did however also utilise Islamic traditions and perceptions of 
ideological commonality across geographical and theological boundaries to increase influence and 
ultimately export their revolution. However this has proved to only be partially successful, with the 
Lebanese group Hezbollah arguably their most influential protégé.      
 13
commonality.  Again, as with other nations, the strongest form of collective 
identification at that time had been transformed and strengthened by events and 
experiences leading up to independence.  In Pakistan, this was Islam and it was 
religion that was to be the cornerstone of national consciousness that would overcome 
ethnic, linguistic and socio-economic differences alongside physical geographical 
separation in the case of East and West Pakistan.11  Although lacking Saudi Arabia’s 
well grounded association with Islam, the emergent Pakistan also sought to 
interweave religion and national identification. The shari’ah became the template for 
individual and social behaviour providing the benchmark for judging government and 
civil societal behaviour. This was emphasised in 1949 when a resolution was passed 
which declared, ‘sovereignty over the entire universe belongs to God Almighty 
Alone.’ Consequently power can only be exercised in Pakistan ‘within the limits 
prescribed by Him’.  Since those early days, the nation-state has swayed between 
secular and Islamic influences. 12  However the legacy of the General Zia-ul-Haq’s 
administration (1977-88), especially the range of concessions awarded and extensive 
programmes of Islamification that were introduced continues to resonate.  For 
example, the interference in affairs in neighbouring Afghanistan was to continue after 
ul-Haq’s death and today’s conflict in the SWAT region and regular terror attacks 
upon the nation’s major cities can be traced to support provided to the (Afghan) 
Taliban.  Like Saudi Arabia, Pakistan in establishing itself as the ‘land of the pure’ 
and emphasising the integration of religion and politics was contributing to 
unachievable expectations.  Encouragement of the Afghan Taliban also needs to be 
considered from a similar perspective.  Seemingly overlooking the potential 
significance of the lack of boundary controls over the Pakistani region that bordered 
Afghanistan, for reasons of realpolitik, the government sought to encourage a brand 
of Islamic interpretation that was incommensurate with the nature of governance in 
Pakistan.  When considering all these factors, it was perhaps inevitable that Pakistan’s 
attempts to gain greater control should ultimately result in greater threat and 
insecurity.    
 
                                                 
11 The subsequent independence of East Pakistan as Bangladesh in 1971 following the war of 
independence highlights that these problems were not successfully overcome across the boundaries of 
post 1947 partition Pakistan.  
12 Ahmad (1994), Ahmed (2004) and Saikal (2003) discuss these issues in detail. 
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Within state sponsored approaches to socialisation, particular attention needs to be 
placed upon the roles of teaching within the modernisation programmes.  
Governments have sought to improve the levels of competencies, skills and 
qualifications and invested in educational systems to deliver graduates who are 
capable of participating within, and developing, the economy.  As I discussed above, 
schools have also been instrumental in the transmission of the hidden curriculum, to 
‘imbue pupils with the new patriotism… . This can be seen in the mobilisation of 
“national” history, geography and the “national curriculum” (McCrone 1998: 47).  
Thus in one of the first modernisation schemes in a Muslim society, schools and 
universities in Turkey were integral components within processes that aimed to 
‘“Turkicize” the people, their language and their culture’ (Kazamias 1966: 148).  
They were what Williamson (1987: 11) described as a ‘vehicle for national 
integration, economic regeneration and modernization.’  
 
Studies of these processes have however tended to overlook the extent to which 
religion is entwined within national curricula, even within the West, most notably the 
United States.  As Smith (2003) has argued, religion can be instrumental in helping to 
define and underpin ideas and policies and reinforce national loyalties.  In Muslim 
societies this is particularly noticeable as even the more secular governments, for 
example Algeria, Egypt, Tunisia and Turkey, concluded that religious values, 
symbols and narrative should be incorporated within school curricula.  There have 
been numerous consequences of this.  At an immediate level, children are exposed 
throughout their schooling to religious teachings and this is very often more radical 
than they would otherwise have encountered from other socialising agents.  For 
example, Kepel (2004), Rahman (1998) and Stern (2003) have identified the 
emphasis placed upon concepts such as jihad within school curricula and textbooks.  
This is not to state that children inevitably internalise Islamic doctrine.  I am however 
declaring that exposure to this type of learning can lead to internalisation when 
individuals are also exposed to conditions or experiences that can be considered to 
legitimise more radical taught forms of Islam (which are briefly elaborated upon 
below).  And over the longer term, improved and extended religious education 
provides pupils with knowledge which they can then disseminate in their subsequent 
careers and within peer groups.  Furthermore the acquisition of skills and attributes 
and familiarity with modern communications and technology means that many 
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gradates are potentially highly useful members of militant, especially terror, groups.  
In other words, schools and universities are exposing graduates to both strands of 
radicalism and the logistical resources that are integral in processes through which 
individuals become involved with terror groups.   
 
There are a number of reasons for the adoption of Islam within state institutions.  The 
societies were to differing levels, experiencing modernisation and associated 
urbanisation, people were relocating, rural communities were weakened, and not 
recreated, in the expanding urban areas.  For the migrants, and indeed many existing 
residents who felt threatened by the changes, there were concerns about the levels of 
alienation and anomie they were encountering as their previous norms, values and 
relationships were displaced or considered irrelevant.  In addition, the electoral appeal 
of Islam, discussed above, resulted in religious education becoming a populist 
electoral tool.  Conversely the rise of other forms of political ideologies, particularly 
those associated with socialism and communism resulted in governments covertly and 
overtly supporting religious institutions as a means of counteracting the rise of secular 
challenging discourse.  Furthermore when secular nationalism was decreasing in 
popularity or failed to engage with the broader populace, religious leaders and 
institutions were incorporated within political arrangements to help legitimise 
government actions.13   
 
Ultimately the ‘top-down’ approach that was adopted by most Muslim nation-states 
failed to engage sufficient numbers of their populations.  Engendering national 
consciousness across boundaries that frequently did not arouse attachments or 
loyalties was always going to be difficult.  Nevertheless the top down approaches did 
not connect with civil societies and large sectors of the populations were not 
incorporated within the modernising agendas.  Equally, attempts to generate other, 
even broader forms of collective consciousness also failed. The most notable failure 
was the Nasser led Arab nationalism which suffered to some extent from inner 
tensions within the ‘Arabs’, a lack of historical legitimacy and ultimately, and most 
decisively, the embarrassing defeat for a coalition of Arab nation-states in the 1967 
war against Israel.  This failure also exemplifies one of the fundamental problems 
                                                 
13 Further details can be found within Abuza 2003, Byman and Green 1999, Esposito 1999, Gerges 
2005, Mardin 1989 and Vertigans 2003. 
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facing relative new nation-states, namely that the nationalism is largely based upon 
the implicit and explicit belief of superiority over other nations.  Without recourse to 
history it is very difficult to provide ‘evidence’ to support this claim, particularly 
when comparing cultural, economic, political and social achievements on a global 
scale.  To return to an earlier point, the history of Islam can provide evidence for 
claims of superiority.  However the particular difficulty facing those who hold such 
views relates to the contradiction between the past and present.  The past symbols the 
power and superiority of Islam, the present its relative weakness and as such a threat 
to their habitus and resultant source of uncertainty and insecurity.  For many of these 
believers, they must struggle to address the decline, to defend their religion and 
confront the existing arrangements.  
 
The involvement of Islamic leaders within positions of authority has had two 
unintentional consequences.  By requiring leaders to strengthen the popularity of the 
government, there was an acknowledgement that Islam was integral.  And the 
dependency upon religious leaders presented them with opportunities to negotiate 
over the terms of their engagement and in particular to gain concessions for their 
support.  Kepel (2004) outlines one of the most notable examples in Saudi Arabia.  
Following the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the Saudi government wanted 
theological legitimacy for the highly controversial deployment of American troops on 
the ‘land of the holy sites.’ In return for supportive fatwas, the government agreed to 
promote more radical interpretations and to allow the enforcement of ‘Islamic’ 
morality.  Enforcement has been disproportionately directed at women whose 
appearance and activities has become increasingly standardised and restricted.  At a 
societal level, these concessions have contributed to a further radicalisation of 
normative standards of religiosity.  The outcome was that the ideological distance 
from normative religious interpretations to militancy diminished and with it the 
likelihood of more people making the transition into radicalism increased.  And of 
course, the concomitant level of theological expectations against which the 
government was measured rose accordingly.  Conversely the engagement of senior 
members of the ulema within state institutions and deeply unpopular decisions 
contributed to a reduction in their own credibility.  They had contributed to raising 
the levels of religiosity and in turn had unintentionally helped to establish a 
theological benchmark that they were seen to be failing.  
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The outcome of the deliberate interweaving of secular political arrangements and 
national consciousness is that religion has continued to be prominent within collective 
identification.  Arguably Islam has become more significant both within individual 
and social habitus in accordance with government attempts to utilise the religion for 
political ends.  Clearly therefore in the short term the policy has been successful.  
However in the longer term, as the above examples of Saudi Arabia and Pakistan 
indicate, the pragmatic application of Islam and the deliberate raising of normative 
levels of religiosity is hugely problematic over the longer term if the nation-states do 
not accord with the dispositions they are encouraging.    
 
Alongside the incorporation of religious institutions within political arrangements, a 
number of leaders have also portrayed themselves as devout committed Muslims.  
Again, it is possible to notice that individual leaders are establishing the criteria for 
them to be measured against which it is impossible for them to meet without the 
implementation of the shari’ah.  Furthermore even this unlikely application would be 
subjected to considerably different interpretations according to the 
historical/contemporary mix.  Probably one of the best examples of this was when 
Anwar Sadat became President of Egypt following the death of Gamal Abdel Nasser. 
He immediately sought to distance himself from his predecessor’s unpopular secular 
policies and ultimately doomed attempt to create Arab nationalism.  Instead Sadat 
emphasised the role of Islam within national identity and he was represented as the 
‘pious president.’  Initially he was successful, Islamic scholars and institutions were 
incorporated within power arrangements that would have been inconceivable under 
Nasser.  The portrayal of the ‘pious president’ connected with the populace but 
arguably led to his assassination.  This is because Sadat and his advisers began to 
have serious misgivings about the power that religious institutions were acquiring and 
the extent of their dissent at a time when broader civil protests were mounting against 
some of his unpopular economic policies.  Consequently he began to distance himself 
from some of the early policies and to curtail some of the influence of religious 
leaders and groups including mass arrests of perceived dissidents.  In the process the 
hopes that he had fashioned were shattered resulting in widespread dissent and 
disillusionment.  Indeed because of this perceived betrayal, the anger and hatred felt 
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towards him may well have exceeded that directed towards the secular Nasser.14  A 
leading Egyptian militant illuminates upon the impact of this in the events which 
ultimately led to Sadat’s assassination.   For the militants, the 1979 peace treaty with 
Israel and Sadat reneging upon his perceived promise to install the shari’ah were 
instrumental in his death.  Conversely, the same respondent stated,  
 
thanks to Sadat,  a new healthy Islamic generation was born unfettered 
and unscarred by persecution and torture like the previous generation in 
the 1950s and 1960s.  My generation had no complexes and no 
nightmares and we paved the way for all subsequent Islamic and jihadist 
waves in the Muslim world, not just Egypt (quoted in Gerges 2006: 47).   
 
For this respondent, the freedoms introduced by Sadat enabled Islamists to interact 
and organise towards the implementation of the shari’ah in a manner that was 
impossible under Nasser’s regime.  Consequently like democracy, discussed in the 
Turkish example above, enhancing opportunities for communication, interaction and 
dissemination can unintentionally contribute towards radicalisation.  On the reverse 
of this, it is important to stress contradictions also exist within strategies of state 
repression that can both prevent terrorism and mobilise militant opposition.  Thus 
attempts at both accommodation and repression can ultimately be self defeating.  
Hafez (2003) study of a range of societies led him to conclude that overall the denial 
of political inclusion is instrumental within radicalisation. This is particularly 
noticeable in contexts where levels of political participation shifted from forms of 
popular inclusion to exclusion.  For example, in Algeria the cancellation of the 
second round of parliamentary elections after the resounding victory of the Front of 
Islamic Salvation (FIS), a religious party, in the first stage had led to a surge of 
militant violence.  In countries where participation has been denied such as Chechnya 
and Tajikistan or taken away, e.g. Algeria and Egypt, ‘rebellion became a legitimate 
strategy for countering repressive state policies’ Hafez (2003: 103).  Some of the 
issues facing these governments are similar to those confronting Western 
administrations within the ‘war on terror’ umbrella.  There is a difficult balance 
between controlling direct threats, addressing the underlying causes for militancy and 
                                                 
14 The rise of militancy in Egypt is discussed in detail in al-Zayyat 2004, Gerges 2005, 2006, Kepel 
2005 and Milton-Edwards 2005. 
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the disproportionate or unjust application of state violence and repressive mechanisms 
which could be considered as evidence for the ‘terrorists’ discourse.  Events and 
controversies following the 2003 American led invasion of Iraq would be a particular 
example of this.   
 
Nevertheless when examining the impact of repression over the shorter term, forcible 
and widespread restraints can seriously reduce the national threat of Islamic militancy.  
For example, the security clampdown during the 1990s in Egypt and to some extent 
Algeria, Indonesia and Saudi Arabia significantly weakened the threat of terrorism 
within these nation-states.  Of course, the threat remains but it has diminished.  
Crucially, the unintended outcome of the effectiveness of the counter terror strategies 
has contributed to terror groups not attracting broad support and their failures to 
seriously challenge governments has, al-Zayyat (2004) and Gerges (2005) suggest, 
been instrumental in the shift of focus for some groups from the ‘near enemy’ to the 
‘far enemy’ of America and the West more generally, under the al-Qa’ida umbrella.  
 
Clearly the resurgence of Islam generally, and militancy in particular, is not simply 
the determinist outcome of people being informed about more radical interpretations 
of religion.  If these beliefs are to be accepted and behavioural patterns changed then 
there has to be some evidence that supports both sides of the militants’ discourse, 
namely that the society is badly flawed and Islamic systems and procedures are a 
better alternative.  Within many Muslim societies, and indeed non Muslim societies, 
there are multiple problems that are associated with processes such as modernisation, 
secularisation and globalisation including unrepresentative, corrupt, disorganised 
governments and weak civil societies. People can witness these factors at local, 
national or international levels. Within more established nation-states, strengths and 
flaws within popular participation have gradually been acknowledged and 
accommodated.  Consequently although these types of problems create anger, anguish 
and insecurities they are rarely considered synonymous with democracy nor lead to 
significant ideological or physical conflict. These forms of conflict have become 
institutionalised, incorporated within political arrangements. However in societies 
where modernisation has been rapid and the individual and social habitus has yet to 
‘catch up’ (Elias 1996), the perceptions of these problems are magnified, symbolic of 
the system’s inherent failings with less exposure to systematic successes that have 
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been internalised over generations.  Consequently loyalty to political parties and 
systems is less embedded, vulnerable to rising fears and perceived threats.  For 
example, in the UK the economic downturn and parliamentary problems have led to 
an increase in protest support for the far right but this is relatively restricted. Any 
challenge to the British government will be from within the institutional framework 
and will not incorporate greater demands for religious involvement within politics.  
By contrast, periodic political scandals and downturns in the performance of Muslim 
nation-states are immediately accompanied by a concomitant decline in support for 
governing secular mainstream parties and a surge in support for political forms of 
religion.  Contrary to most Western nation-states, religion remains embedded with 
individual habitus and a viable political alternative to other forms of discourse.  And 
one of the reasons why Islam continues to have the potential to mobilise political 
support stems from the early history.  From its origins and the period of Muhammed 
and his four immediate successors, Islam has provided a comprehensive framework 
for life.  The early empires were based upon Islamic practice and behaviour.  
Although the extent to which there was a pragmatic division of power and integration 
between religious, secular and pre-Islamic influences remains heavily contested, 
millions of people associate their ways of behaving and thinking with the advent of 
Islam.  Similarly the expansion of the religion across large swathes of territory is also 
considered to be the outcome of adherence to Islamic tenets.  Conversely the decline 
of related empires, most notably the Ottoman, was associated with a preceding 
decline in religious practices.  In other words the rise of the West and weakening of 
Muslim regions was not a consequence of the superiority of the procedures and 
beliefs of the former but the weaknesses of Muslims during that period.15   
 
Within these environments, a collective ethnic consciousness that may have existed 
during anti-colonial movements has frequently not been sufficiently transformed into 
a social national consciousness.  By comparison, Islamic interpretations remained 
throughout processes of modernisation, deeply ingrained within social processes and 
traditions, retaining the potential for radical mobilisation if secularisation should be 
seen to have failed.  And the nation-states’ formal processes are failing to deliver 
promises of superior performance and related rules of closure are de-legitimised.  For 
                                                 
15 Hassan 2002, Lewis 2002, Mandaville 2001 and Sutton and Vertigans 2005 discuss these issues in 
detail. 
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Muslims, the poor performance extends beyond market economics to cause tensions 
across all aspects of society where Islam has not been applied.   
 
Within international relations many Muslim governments face further contradictory 
demands.  At one level, close relationships with the United States are considered 
essential in development and to safeguard sovereignty.  Yet these relationships are 
also the source of considerable unrest within the nation as governments risk being 
perceived as American satellites or stooges.  Through this association national 
governments become entwined within processes of anti-Americanism.  Governments 
must therefore be sensitive to these conflicting national and international 
requirements and many seek to engage in, or at least to be implicitly permitting, anti-
Western rhetoric while covertly developing closer relations with Western nation-
states.  Such a policy is not without problems.  The increasingly pervasive media via 
the internet can bypass most forms of censorship and raise awareness of the 
contradictions in government policies and actions. And by allowing or even 
encouraging anti Western sentiments, governments are also contributing to levels of 
antagonism and associated slogans and images becoming more accepted and 
embedded within social habitus and thus further distanced from the direction that 
governments ultimately want to travel.   
 
Alongside the pragmatic decision-making that has resulted in the enemy shifting 
outwards, the formation of contemporary trans-national identification has been 
considerably aided through globalisation and the transcendence of geographical 
boundaries.16  Tremendous advancements in media, communications, transportation 
and extensive patterns of migration means that peoples are exposed to new 
experiences and messages with different frameworks of meaning.  Through these new 
and multiple influences, new forms of identity have formed that are meaningful in 
these evolving figurations. For many people, new loyalties form which transcend 
national, racial, ethnic and socio-economic barriers (Turner 1994, van der Veer 1994).  
The re-emphasis upon the ummah is part of this broader shift in collective forms of 
identification and the concomitant huge increase in transnational and global Muslim 
movements.  These include ‘such diverse groups as publication and propaganda 
                                                 
16 Further details can be found in Bunt 2003, Sakr 2001 and Sutton and Vertigans 2005. 
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organizations, missionary (da’wa) societies, Sufi brotherhoods, banks, youth 
associations, emigrant communities with international ties and others’ (Lapidus 2002: 
868).  For the vast majority of Muslims, these new relationships are assimilated, 
evolving individual and social habitus, constituting different ways of working, 
studying, shopping, communicating and believing that accord with their experiences.  
The ummah provides peaceful networks, interrelationships and collective senses of 
identification.  Although this ummah is not in direct conflict with nation-states, it 
clearly provides different forms of explanation and meaning that can implicitly 
challenge nationalism and weaken national allegiance.  At the extreme of those 
increasingly emphasising the global community are groups associated with al-Qa’ida, 
discussed above, who are also utilising developments within globalisation to generate 
greater interest and support to explicitly challenge nation-states.    
 
 
Conclusion  
 
The demise of the Ottoman Empire and Western colonialism were instrumental in the 
formation of independent Muslim nation-states.  Emergent governments adopted 
multiple forms of discourse, policies and structures as they attempted to generate and 
embed national consciousness and modernisation.  All nation-states have, to varying 
degrees, implemented programmes of secularisation ranging from the more covert 
methods introduced by nation-states like Pakistan and Saudi Arabia to the explicitly 
secular regimes in Turkey, Morocco and Tunisia.  Interesting, and perhaps 
surprisingly, in light of the preceding sentence, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia currently 
face the most threatening challenge from militant Islamists.  However, nation-states 
pursuing more rigorous secular processes have also become increasingly embedded 
with religious symbols and rhetoric while institutions have been penetrated by 
significant numbers of religious personnel.  The incorporation of Islam within cultural, 
economic, legal political and social realms reflects the limited success of secular 
national consciousness.  Governments struggled to convince their citizens about the 
discontinuous histories of their ‘peoples.’ Consequently when people were requiring 
meaning during persistent periods of uncertainty and transformation, national 
frameworks of understanding were unable to provide adequate explanations. In these 
circumstances even secular governments increasingly adopted religious symbols and 
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narratives to justify experiences and legitimise the national concept.  Like their 
Islamist rivals, they too utilised the Islamic ‘Golden Age’ in order to underpin the 
present to connect with collective forms of identification.  By interweaving religion 
within nationalism, national elites have been able to strengthen national 
consciousness that accords with individual and social habitus.  However 
governments’ lack of theological legitimacy and inconsistent approach has meant that 
the credibility of their ‘conversions’ has often been weak. Conversely, despite this, 
the introduction and support for the greater implementation of Islamic values and 
practices has contributed to normative levels of behaviour becoming more devout and 
in some instances more radical.  For governments this unintentionally helped in the 
reinvigoration of Islamic influences within challenging political discourse across 
societies.  In other words, national administrations have unintentionally assisted in the 
development of what is arguably the biggest threat to their dominance, namely more 
radical Islamic groups.  Therefore, governments which have most actively sought to 
raise the profile of religion, with Islamic leaders participating within political 
processes, have raised normative standards of behaviour and expectations across 
society that they cannot address.  By comparison while processes of radicalisation can 
be observed in more secular nation-states, the Islamists threat is less extensive and 
prominent.  However the shift towards greater levels of Islamification within these 
nations is likely to be accompanied by a rise in the Islamic threat.  
 
The formation and popularity of these groups and the transcending of national 
boundaries associated with ‘al-Qa’ida’ has also been enabled by the surge in global 
communications.  Faster and more pervasive methods of communication both enable 
improved forms of interaction between groups, members and potential supporters and 
information to be gained about national and international policies and events that may 
previously have been suppressed, ignored or barely reported.  The outcome of this 
double-sided edge to global communication is that people are exposed both to 
information about more militant forms of Islam and images and narrative that may 
well connect with the discourse and enhance the likelihood of support.    
 
In summary, Muslim governments have faced dilemmas since their formation 
regarding the nature of their administration and how to engage and restrain 
sufficiently large numbers of people.  Clearly restraint is much easier if individuals 
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internalise controls that moderate their own behaviour.  At times when nation-states 
were facing growing unrest, greater emphasis has been placed upon Islam as a way of 
providing meaning, purpose and norms and values which when internalised provide 
the framework for individual constraint.  However Islam can also be a mobilising 
force for change if state sponsored emotional and behavioural dispositions are not 
matched by the sponsor.  In conditions where governments are seen to be failing at 
multiple levels large numbers of people are attracted by the possibilities of an 
alternative ideology that is, as various state institutions inform, legitimised by the past.  
For Muslim administrations this is perhaps the overriding unintended consequence 
and redressing the secular/religion balance without undermining already fragile forms 
of national consciousness is hugely problematic.  Governments’ successes and/or 
failures in achieving this will be fundamental in determining the longevity and 
pervasiveness of the militant Islamic threat.  The task facing these nation-states is 
extremely difficult.  When taking into consideration, the reality and seriousness of 
unintended consequences and the unforeseen nature and extent of ripples caused by 
government actions within complex interwoven global relations and activities, the 
challenge is magnified to an extent that the outcomes cannot be confidently predicted. 
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